For the past several years I've been working mostly on its epistemology, where I favour a non-uniform position: the canonical method for modal discovery will differ depending on the portion of the modal realm we're inquiring into. 

     Before starting developing my own account, I was heavily invested into scrutinising other epistemologies of modality one finds in the literature and unfolding why I think these theories don't meet their targets. The results of this negative task—which has involved the study of the views of salient philosophers in the field, like Chalmers, Peacocke, Williamson and Yablo, among others—has been published in journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, Noûs, and Philosophia Scientiae.

     In the past years, I have transitioned away from this negative task and have started developing my own view on the matter. Following a "slowly but surely" principle, I've started, quite non-ambitiously, by aiming to explain our modal knowledge of some ordinary possibility facts, such as that I could break my arm. Despite its non-ambitiousness, this provides at least some of the explanations that, as I've motivated, the rationalist have failed to provide. The first piece of this positive research--"Similarity and Possibility: an epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities"--is published in Modal Epistemology after Rationalism, edited by Bob Fischer and Felipe Leon; a volume that marks the empiricist turn in the epistemology of modality. 

     A second piece works in tandem with the previous one to increase the ambitiousness of the overall project. Here, I explore the kind of epistemology of modality available to explain our modal knowledge of abstract entities. This has appeared in Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivete Fred and Jess Leech. Both these pieces have been developed with support from an AHRC Leadership Fellowship (Early Career) for the project: "Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality". 

Currently, I continue working on the epistemology of modality, and of essence, but I am also going back to metaphysical issues, especially on the nature of modality. This metaphysical investigation is heavily informed though by my acquired view on the epistemology of modality and the limits of our knowability of modal matters. 

Apart from modality, there are many other areas that attract me in philosophy. They include Ontology in general, Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Formal Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science and Moral Philosophy.

To be honest, though, I maximally enjoy those when I can see useful connections to what most worries me in modality; but I guess this is how it works for most of us.

I did both my B.A. (2003) and my Ph.D. (2007) in Logos, under supervision of Manuel García-Carpintero (a great experience).

During the time I was writing my dissertation, I spent three fall terms as a visiting research student in Arché (St. Andrews) attracted by the Modality Project that Bob Hale was leading at that time, with whom I work during those terms (another great experience).