I'm a Senior Lecturer at Stirling. I started there in September 2007 with a five-year RCUK Academic Fellowship. I'm also an Associate Fellow of the Logos Research Group (Barcelona)
Before that, and right after finishing my Ph.D., I spent 3 months as a post-doctoral visiting researcher at the CMM in Leeds.

I did both my B.A. (2003) and my Ph.D. (2007) in Logos, under supervision of Manuel García-Carpintero (a great experience!). 
During the time I was writing my dissertation, I spent three fall terms as a visiting research student in Arché, attracted by the Modality Project that Bob Hale was leading at that time. 

I work primarily on modality, both its metaphysics and its epistemology. I've been working on it since I became a graduate student (2002) and I plan to keep on working on it for a few more years. (Perhaps I shouldn't be particularly proud of it, but I feel very comfortable on the longest path to truth.)
     For the past several years I've been working mostly on its epistemology, where I favour an empiricist position; although I'm finding more and more ways in which this label must be qualified (if at all  kept).
     Up to recently, my task has been devoted to explaining why the epistemologies of modality one finds in the literature don't meet their targets. The results of this negative taskwhich  has involved the study of the views of salient philosophers in the field, like Chalmers, Peacocke, Williamson and Yablo, among othershas been published in journals such as Dialectica, Logique et AnalyseNoûs, and Philosophia Scientiae.
     At the moment, I am at a transitional period between the negative and the positive tasks of my research project in the epistemology of modality. I am researching on the general reasons that limit the explanatory power of any concept-based epistemology of modality (typically rationalist). But I'm also interested in identifying, precisely, how far the explanatory power extends. I'm combining this with the development of my positive views which, it is intended, should provide at least some of the explanations that, as I've motivated, the rationalist have failed to provide. The first piece of this positive research--Similarity and Possibility: an epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities--has recently appeared in Modal Epistemology after Rationalismedited by Bob Fischer and Felipe Leon. A second piece, where I explore the kind of epistemology of modality available to explain our modal knowledge of abstract entities is forthcoming Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivete Fred and Jess Leech. Both these pieces have been developed with support from an AHRC Leadership Fellowship (Early Career) for the project: "Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality". 

Apart from modality, there are many other areas that attract me in philosophy. They include Ontology in general, Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, Formal Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science and Moral Philosophy.
To be honest, though, I maximally enjoy those when I can see useful connections to what most worries me in modality; but I guess this is how it works for most of us.