| Rohrbaugh and deRosset on the Necessity of Origin (With Ross Cameron) |
| Mind 115/458: 361-366 |
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2006 |
In ‘A New Route to the Necessity of Origin’, Rohbraugh and deRosset offer an argument for the Necessity of Origin appealing neither to Suffciency of Origin nor to a branching-times model of necessity. What is doing the crucial work in their argument is instead the thesis they name ‘Locality of Prevention’. In this response, we object that their argument is question-begging by showing, first, that the locality of prevention thesis is not strong enough to satisfactorily derive from it the intended conclusion, and, second, that the argument is not sound unless the Necessity of Origin is operating as an implicit premiss.
Penultimate draft
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| Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality: “Flexibility of Origins” Plus S4 |
| Erkenntnis 65/3: 405-26 |
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2006 |
Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. Regarding their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However, the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins.
Penultimate draft |
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| Conceivability and de re modal knowledge |
| Noûs |
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forthcoming |
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
Penultimate draft |
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| Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge |
| Logique et Analyse |
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forthcoming |
The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W).
Penultimate draft |
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| Recent trends in essentialism |
| Philosophy Compass |
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forthcoming |
| According to Essentialism, an object’s properties divide into those that are essential and those that are accidental. While being human is commonly thought to be essential to Socrates, being a philosopher plausibly is not. We can motivate the distinction by appealing—as we just did—to examples. However, it is not obvious how best to characterize the notion of essential property, nor is it easy to give conclusive arguments for the essentiality of a given property. In this paper, I elaborate on these fundamental issues and explore the way in which essential properties behave in relation to other related notions. If we believe an individual a has essential properties, shall we believe also in properties that are unique to a—properties that no individual other than a can have? Shall we believe also in properties that are both essential and unique? If so, do they set the basis for understanding the ontological status of merely possible objects? How does essentialism interact with modal logic? |
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| Modal epistemology, modal concepts, and the Integration Challenge. |
| Dialectica |
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forthcoming |
The paper argues against Peacocke’s moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke’s account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account’s metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. However, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support Peacocke’s moderate rationalism.
Penultimate draft |
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