Drafts available on request (if-and-when they exist)   

A paper on the prospects of the epistemology of essence 
The epistemology of essence is part and parcel of the epistemology of modality. Fleeing from innateness or mysterious intuitions, rationalism in modality is mostly defended by means of a concept-based account, either of the sort of Peacocke’s—which takes modal concepts to encode the essential truths—or of the sort of Chalmers’—which, instead, takes essential truths to be spread across the conceptual network. In this paper, I shall offer a diagnosis of the limits and prospects of a rationalist, concept-based epistemology of essence. The suggested conclusion will be as follows. When p is itself (believed to be) knowable a priori, there might be room for a satisfactory concept-based explanation of the knowability of the essentiality of p (whenever essential). By contrast, when p is knowable only a posteriori, the knowability conditions of p’s essentiality (whenever essential) will resist a concept-based treatment. This, it must be stressed, would be so for considerations largely independent of the acknowledgement of a posteriori necessities of the Kripke/Putnam sort. Rather, the grounds for this conclusion, if correct, jeopardize even the status of fundamental apriority that rationalist concept-based accounts claim for a posteriori necessities.

A paper on blind reasoning epistemologies, with a focus on modality and logic  
It is increasingly common to formulate and address epistemological questions in terms of the integration challenge. Roughly, this is the challenge of, for a given domain, providing an epistemology of how we know truths in that domain that it is adequate for its metaphysics. The paper has two parts. In the first one I identify the elements that are arguably involved, as requirements to be satisfied, in the integration challenge. In the second part, I assess two blind reasoning epistemologies in different domains—Peacocke’s epistemology of modality, and Boghossian’s epistemology of logic—vis-à-vis the four elements identified in the first part. Although those cases are different, they nonetheless share enough elements for the exploration of the former to inform the exploration of the latter; and, more ambitiously, for those explorations to shed light on the prospects of blind reasoning epistemologies in general

A paper on the prospects of a priori knowledge
A great deal of our beliefs, both within and outside philosophy, are a priori. But how many of those beliefs can be warrantedly attributed as knowledge? This paper is an exploration of this issue. It approaches it by taking into consideration, on the one hand, the substantiality, or lack of it, of the contents believed and, on the other, the existence of substantial agreement or disagreement about them among epistemic peers. It takes into consideration these two dimensions because, as I shall motivate, the epistemic significance of agreement or disagreement should (be taken to) vary depending on whether it is substantial or non-substantial contents that are at issue.